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Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have a comparable population of just over 4 million people. Tatars are more successful, than Bashkirs, in agriculture (Tatar 0.922 tons of grain per capita versus Bashkir 0.787 tons of grain per capita). Tatars are also richer and more developed, than Bashkirs, in industry (Tatar 8 243.8 kWh per capita versus Bashkir 6 508.5 kWh per capita). Actually, the difference in values of 2 MWh per capita is a chasm. This difference is equivalent to the consumption of 8 billion kWh per year, and that's a lot. This is more, than consumes each neighboring area, i.e. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan differ from each other by an entire region of 1 million people or more. If assume, that each kWh gives about 15 rubles in value, then the difference in rubles is 120 billion rubles per year. Let's get acquainted with the facts..
Tatarstan — 4 003 016 people, electricity — 33 billion kWh (8 243.8 kWh per capita)
Bashkortostan — 4 064 361 people, electricity — 26 453 million kWh (6 508.5 kWh per capita)
Nizhny Novgorod region — 3 060 335 people, electricity — 20 075 million kWh (6 559.7 kWh per capita)
Udmurtia — 1 434 557 people, electricity — 9 374 million kWh (6 534.4 kWh per capita)
Ulyanovsk region — 1 172 782 people, electricity — 5 611 million kWh (4 784.35 kWh per capita)
Chuvashia — 1 167 061 people, electricity — 5 309.5 million kWh (4 549.5 kWh per capita)
Mordovia — 765 891 people, electricity — 3 335.1 million kWh (4 354.5 kWh per capita)
Mari El — 669 854 people, electricity — 2 666.9 million kWh (3 972.4 kWh per capita)
* Samara region — 3 127 842 people, electricity — 22 654 million kWh (7 242.7 kWh per capita)
The level of development in an industrial society is proportional to the level of energy consumption (per capita and in general), because the main energy consumer is machines and industry. Without machines it is impossible even to grind grain into flour, too much human labor will be required to replace the machine, and in some ways it is impossible to replace the machine at all. In this case, the subjects are arranged according to the amount of consumption of kWh as a whole. More, than 8 billion kWh (excluding Nizhny Novgorod region), is consumed only by Udmurtia, it is energy–deficient both in power and consumption (more than half of the electricity is imported). Accordingly, the difference between Tatars and Bashkirs is about a million and a half people and human labor in production. Tatars are the first league (8 MWh per capita and above), this is above the all–russian level, which is the second league, and this includes Bashkortostan, Udmurtia and Nizhny Novgorod region (6 MWh per capita and above). Semi–agrarian Ulyanovsk region, Chuvashia, Mordovia and Mari El hang out in the third league (4 MWh per capita and above). In principle, Penza Region and Kirov Region could also fit here — this is also the third world in terms of industrial development and life (poverty).
Tatars have problems in the energy sector, they lack 5 billion kWh. In such cases, either import electricity, or install new power plants. For production of 5 billion kWh, it requires at least 70 billion rubles of investment in energy sector. To import the same 5 billion kWh, need to sell products and services worth 20 billion rubles at a price of 4 rubles per kWh. Tatars followed the path of import (it is cheaper for short distances), but this is a commodity exchange scenario, which implies the export of products and services worth at least 20 billion rubles. Therefore, in order to buy electricity, sales markets are needed for the products and services produced. Accordingly, for the existence of Tatarstan as a structure, the whole world is divided into suppliers of electricity and consumers of Tatar products. The third world (Chuvash, Cheremisa, Kirov, Penza, etc.) is no longer suitable, because they are not a supplier of electricity (they do not have enough themselves) and are unable to buy Tatar products and services for at least 20 billion rubles (because they are poor).
Only the second world remains, but we must note, that the economy is not being built around Kazan, as if it were the center of the world–economy. In this case, Kazan should sell products to the surrounding regions, in exchange for buying electricity from them. However, the market for Tatarstan is not the surrounding, but the external space, so nothing is built around Tatarstan. For example, Samara is the most developed, does not require investments in fixed assets, does not require maintenance, is located on the Volga (and has a port, which differs from Nizhny Novgorod), river transportation is cheaper, than any other (automobile, railway, aviation, etc.). Samara cannot sell a lot of electricity without harming, but can buy products and services, which makes the movement to Samara promising. What did the Tatars forget in this case in Bashkortostan, which cannot sell electricity and cannot buy products and services worth at least 20 billion rubles. We should not forget, that Bashkortostan is the same oil refining industry, i.e. a competitor of the Tatars. Let's get acquainted with other facts.
Mordovia — 765 891 people, 1 387 100 tons of grain (1.811 tons per capita, + 621 000 people)
Ulyanovsk region — 1 172 782 people, 1 500 000 tons of grain (1.28 tons per capita, + 327 000 people)
Samara region — 3 127 842 people, 3 657 000 tons of grain (1.17 tons per capita, + 529 000 people)
Tatarstan – 4 003 016 people, 3 690 000 tons of grain (0.922 tons per capita, – 313 000 people)
Bashkortostan — 4 064 361 people, 3 200 000 tons of grain (0.787 tons per capita, – 864 000 people)
Chuvashia — 1 167 061 people, 780 000 tons of grain (0.67 tons per capita, – 387 000 people)
Udmurtia — 1 434 557 people, 750 000 tons of grain (0.523 tons per capita, – 684 000 people)
Mari El — 669 854 people, 360 000 tons of grain (0.537 tons per capita, – 310 000 people)
Nizhny Novgorod region — 3 060 335 people, 1 500 000 tons of grain (0.49 tons per capita, – 1 560 000 people)
This time, the subjects are arranged according to the production (but not consumption) of grain per capita. If assume, that the cost of living for one person is within one ton of grain per capita per year, then Tatars exist at the level of profitability (and even lower), i.e. Tatarstan is overpopulated, for further demographic and economic development, either grain imports are needed, or to plow Tatarstan. In order to close the internal demand and fix the current population (without demographic growth and without depopulation), Tatars need to ban grain exports, as well as an additional 300 thousand tons of grain. For production of 300 thousand tons of grain, investments in agriculture are necessary. For the import 300 thousand tons of grain, necessary to export products and services worth 4.5 billion rubles with a price of 15 thousand rubles per ton of grain. If in this case follow the path of import, then can buy grain for domestic consumption and for demographic growth from Mordvins (they can give an increase of about 600 thousand people), Ulyanovsk (300 thousand people) and Samara (500 thousand people). In the future, this is 1 million Tatars, and there is no point in going somewhere else for grain, because there is no grain anywhere else. Bashkirs as a nation are unprofitable, like everything else below Bashkirs, unable to feed not only their descendants, but also themselves, this is depopulation and russification.
If import 1 million tons of grain at 15 thousand rubles per ton, then this is 15 billion rubles to 20 billion rubles per electricity, accordingly, this is an export of at least 35 billion rubles, the third world is again in flight. Tatars have not yet given birth to 1 million Tatars under 1 million tons of grain, but it does not occur to Tatars to buy this million, process it (flour, bread, feed, milk, meat, etc.) and sell it back to feed the local tribes and their cattle, leaving the added value at home. It does not occur to them to buy food, instead, Tatars sell grain (which they themselves do not have enough), but they do not sell it to their neighbors, and not in order for the neighbors to process (flour, bread, feed, milk, meat, etc.) and sell back to Tatars. As a result, there is no internal market, because there is no division of labor (one grows grain, another processes it into flour, third into bread, etc.). Lack of nutrition is not covered by either imports or production, and leads to depopulation (malnutrition). And what about Bashkortostan? Everything is the same, only one level below. Exactly the same malnutrition and depopulation, no one will give birth, if there is nothing to feed, and there is nothing to feed even the existing population — a deficit of more than 200 kg per capita per year and more than 800 thousand tons of grain at all. Bashkirs do not even try to spend at least 12 billion rubles on imports at a price of 15 thousand rubles per ton, selling something to Samara and Ulyanovsk.
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The demand for grain and the surplus grain of local tribes are estimated in hundreds of thousands of tons, supply and demand are separated from each other by hundreds of kilometers. Even without processing, moving such a volume requires a river fleet as the cheapest transport for such volumes. Tatars have their own shipbuilding in Zelenodolsk, they have money to load capacity, but they do not have fleet. Although even Norilsk Nickel has fleet. This means, that Tatars do not consider Tatarstan as a commercial enterprise, that buys or sells something (imports or exports by water) and do not seek independence in import and export. Nizhny Novgorod, which positions itself as a city with trading traditions, has shipbuilding industry, has a need for grain (1.5 million tons for 22.5 billion rubles at 15 thousand rubles per ton), therefore Nizhny Novgorod residents (there is doubt, that these are Russians, and not some local aborigines, who switched to russian a few centuries ago) razed their port with cranes, gave shipbuilding to the "real" (there are doubts here too) Russians and dream of going somewhere to eat. There is a need for grain in Mari El, there is at least some shipbuilding, but there is no fleet to buy, bring and feed. There is something in Chuvashia, but there is no fleet there either. It is not necessary to have shipbuilding, although it is desirable, ships can be bought, and merchant fleet allows to plan purchases and sales — import resources (grain, oil, metal, etc.), process (into flour, meat or milk, chemicals, machine tools, machinery and equipment, etc.) and export to the sale of the product. Why do local tribes need the Volga? There is a feeling, that for them this is not a highway, but some kind of obstacle, that is better covered with earth. And why do they need states, if they do not consider them as commercial enterprises in a certain territory? There is the Volga, but not everyone has a port on the Volga with normal cranes (and even in the form of a simple pier). Samara has it, Kazan has it, that's all.
If assume, that 1 kWh is equivalent to 15 rubles of products and services, then the average Tatar creates an approximate value of about 124 thousand rubles (excluding fuel, which is also involved in value creation). With an average salary of 70 thousand rubles, approximately 54 thousand rubles per capita or at least 216 billion in total remain for accumulation. Tatars have a lot to develop, because not everyone is involved in creating value on the territory of the republic. For development, resources and sales markets are needed (to buy grain and electricity, selling finished products, etc.), but even if Tatars bought grain in the south and sold it in the north without processing it into flour, then this is already speculative food for ships (if with a visit to Tatarstan for processing into flour, then food is still and for Tatars). The average Bashkir creates an approximate value of about 98 thousand rubles, gets 68 thousand in his hands, approximately 30 thousand per capita or 120 billion rubles from all goes into accumulation, the possibilities are two times less, than those of Tatars, who ran too far ahead. If sell something to Bashkirs for only 10 thousand rubles per Bashkir per year (products for less than 1 thousand rubles per month), then Tatars can earn 40 billion rubles from Bashkirs, and even if half is the cost, then the second half will be enough for grain and electricity. It is obvious, that Tatars are not driven to Bashkortostan by economic need, not by a strategy of accumulating value, not by a development strategy, not by a survival strategy, they are not there to "eat" and not to "earn". The Tatars generally have some kind of phenomenally disregard for their republic.
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If assume, that the meaning of modernity is, among other things, the level of energy consumption per capita (energy for performing physical work in order to replace muscular strength with mechanical strength), then Tatars are a more modern nation, than Bashkirs, they are more industrially developed. If educe the essence of the conflict to the ordinary envy of the "poor to the successful", then the recipe for peace and harmony should be to equalize energy consumption both through increasing the energy consumption of Bashkirs and through reducing (restraining) the energy consumption of Tatars. In the latter case, this is deterrence up to an outright ban on the introduction of new capacities, as well as curbing the flow of energy to Tatarstan. In the first case, this is a flow of 8 billion kWh to Bashkortostan (which exceeds the energy consumption of any neighbor, i.e. there is simply nowhere to take such volumes, except by de–energizing some area, and not one), or the introduction of new capacities (which takes time, even with the introduction of new capacities of 800 million kWh per year (for a power plant of 200 MW of installed capacity) it will take ten years, during which Tatars must stand still). And this is without taking into account consumers (extractive and/or manufacturing industries) and the output of products by such consumers, which means there is a sufficient sales market, which simply does not exist and which simply does not exist. This means, that the conflict is already unsolvable, if we reduce it to a difference in development (the first and second world), too much time has been lost (more than 10 years), 2 MWh is a lot. Bashkirs are a very good illustration for the phrase "time is money", and what poverty happens, when time is wasted. Bashkirs have nowhere to take products worth 8 billion kWh, as well as the 8 billion kWh, is the level of a nuclear power plant, which costs about 1 trillion rubles, which the Bashkirs do not have, and no one will give it to them anymore (Moscow does not have so much for Bashkirs), and this is without taking into account investments in fixed assets also about 1 trillion rubles. When this amount is spread out over 10 years, there will be a need for capital investments of about 200 billion rubles per year, which Bashkirs do not have (their fund is about 120 billion rubles). To have it, need to pay less (because there is no one to borrow so much from), i.e. increase from 120 billion rubles to 200 billion rubles by reducing wages from 68 thousand rubles to 48 thousand rubles, which Bashkirs will not agree to. Etc., here can not even try to sort out the options, but there is no place for revanchist sentiments here anymore (can't afford it), so Tatarophobia immediately.
Conclusions? This conflict is very long–lasting (perhaps forever), it cannot be resolved, because it takes a lot of time and money (investments in fixed assets), which do not exist and will not be. This is a conflict between elites (established and failed economically), not nations. Can ignore the words and skirmishes, that surround the conflict, because the reason is 2 MWh of difference per capita, which are missing. This still does not answer the question of what Tatars forgot in Bashkortostan. Although the answer is on the surface, there are more than 1 million Tatars living there, which may born without Bashkortostan, if buying 1 million tons of grain from Ulyanovsk and Samara. Then why go into conflict, if can give birth without conflict, there must be some good reason?
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Tatars and Bashkirs have a French–type statehood, which was formed about two hundred years ago during the French Revolution (civil society). The pure French model assumes a dominant ethnic group and a dominant language (the language of so–called interethnic communication), in relation to which other languages on the territory of the state are secondary and "local". French–type statehood implies the citizenship of each member of society, while completely ignoring his ethnic origin and native language (i.e. citizenship is an instrument of linguistic assimilation). French model does not imply any federalization, much less statehood for the "locals". Following this model, the language of interethnic communication in Russia is Russian in the presence of "local" languages, in England and USA English with bilingualism of all others, in Germany German, etc. If continue logically, then there should be Tatar in Tatarstan, Bashkir in Bashkortostan, with Tatar / Bashkir citizenship and complete disregard for the real ethnicity of the inhabitants of Tatarstan / Bashkortostan, as well as the absence of any national formations within Tatarstan / Bashkortostan, which is inevitable in the development (completion of formation) of statehood and a political nation.
Not a single state in the Volga region can be called established. There are two ethnic groups in Mordovia (Erzya and Moksha), that have different languages, which means, that when the formation of national statehood is completed, a fight is inevitable not only with the Russian language, but also with each other (or the disintegration of Mordovia into two national states). Have a similar situation in Mari El, where in addition to Russians there are two ethnic groups of mountain and meadow Cheremis, which, in order to form their statehood according to the French model, need not only to resolve the conflict with the Russian language, but also with each other. Russian and Udmurt languages have a similar situation in Udmurtia (conflict between Russian and Udmurt languages), Chuvashia (conflict between Russians and Chuvash and their languages without the amortizing role of Jews), and any other national republic not only in Volga region. To take place is statehood, like that of France, which to this day is an example of an industrial civil state. In Russia, this is exactly the model for a Russian–speaking civil state, but it contains national states, small France, which are absent from the original model.
Statehood has not yet taken place in Tatarstan, because the question of whose language will be the main and international — Russian or Tatar, has not been resolved. Other ethnic groups, living on the territory of Tatarstan, do not claim the title role and agree to any winner (and his language, i.e. to be bilingual). Bashkirs are no exception, where there is also a language conflict, which is inevitable, when forming statehood according to the French model. However, the disposition here is not similar to others, because Russians (Russian language), Tatars (Tatar language) and Bashkirs (Bashkir language, which is minimally different from Tatar), there are smaller players (Chuvash, Cheremisa, Udmurts), who do not pretend to the titular role, but diligently sabotage Bashkir attempts to take on such a role, hiding Russians and the Russian language, thereby sabotaging the development and formation of Bashkir statehood, and having their own unformed statehood outside Bashkortostan, i.e. they exist as diasporas.
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A conflict (from lat. conflictus — collision) is a clash of (incompatible) oppositely directed goals, interests, positions, opinions or views of opponents. Bashkirs' position is to build statehood on the territory of Bashkortostan with Bashkir as the official language, while all others are bilingual. Position of the Tatars is similar, but on the territory of Tatarstan, and there seems to be no contradictions between Tatars and Bashkirs. Since Russians categorically do not want to learn languages, Tatars and Bashkirs have a common enemy. But Tatars have an alternative position, Tatars are not only Tatar–speaking residents of Tatarstan, but also Tatar–speaking people, who are scattered (diaspora). This is another model of national existence, where the nation is extraterritorial (scattered), has no state borders and no state, but does not cease to be a nation by virtue of identification as belonging to a certain community. This is not a Tatar invention, the Jews were the first to try this method (who invented it), then Islam took this scenario (but in its own way). Judging by the dynamics, Tatars are increasingly inclined to this scenario, which leads them away from conflict with Russians, who will not learn Tatar anyway, but leads to conflict with Bashkirs. And also the dismantling of statehood, because, if there is no Tatar, then there is no titular ethnos (civil nation), which means there is no titular language for such a nation. However, Tatars also live on the territory of Bashkortostan, where a Bashkir civil nation is being formed on the French model, and Bashkirs do not seem to give up their territorial statehood in favor of the Jewish diaspora scenario. So we come to a conflict in the second approximation, where Tatars, formally being Bashkirs in their territory of residence, remain Tatars by ethnicity (as Jews remain Jews regardless of citizenship and place of residence). These are two opposite and conflicting positions — anyone, but in a certain territory, or strictly defined, but anywhere. If recall, that small players (Chuvash, meadow Cheremisa, Udmurts) are in the same position, who can also appeal to their national republics as a diaspora, then the situation for Bashkirs becomes stalemate.
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For a snack, it makes sense to trace, how it all started, how it developed, and draw some conclusions. It all started in the middle of the noughties, when Tatars asked themselves, what kind of money the Tatar statehood would exist for (then it was still like that). Since Tatars had already dealt with oil, at first it was a cooperation project on the territory of Ukraine. There is no need to continue further, because then there were events in Kremenchug, after which Tatars returned to the original issue, but now it has become a project for deep refining of oil (petrochemistry) from oil, that Tatars themselves extracted, on the territory of Tatarstan.
However, this is not enough, because still need to go into deep processing, but Tatars did everything. They persevered for ten years, invested in fixed assets, the difference in values of 2 MWh did not appear immediately. And it should be noted, that this went unnoticed by Moscow, and what consequences it will lead to. But even then it was still about statehood, Tatar as mandatory for everyone, Russian at will. In the middle of the tenth, a crushing blow was dealt to Tatar statehood (and not only), Russian is mandatory, Tatar is optional. This is where the French scenario of Tatar political nation ended, Tatarstan became meaningless, and petrochemicals and income remained.
However, this is not enough, need to enter the diaspora model (a scattered and non–citizen diaspora nation). And from half–witted mothers, who write to the prosecutor's office, because their children are forced to learn Tatar language, Tatars moved to Bashkortostan, where there are already 1 million Tatars ready, because to grow 1 million by buying grain from Russians in Samara and Ulyanovsk is long, expensive, and taking into account half–witted mothers and mandatory russian, futile and humiliating. And Moscow will no longer be able to dissuade the Tatars from 1 million Tatars in Bashkortostan, because what in return, 2 million half–witted Russian mothers in Tatarstan, who do not want to learn Tatar? Thank, eat for self, and it's too late for them to teach it, the choice has already been made in favor of the diaspora (extraterritorial existence with money from petrochemicals), far–sighted people pack their bags with such introductory ones.
In parallel, there were well–known events that made it possible to destroy the statesmen in Tatarstan, when the citizens of a foreign state are still their own. If they are Russians and live in Ukraine, or if they are Tatars and live in Bashkortostan, what difference does it make, the nation is no longer determined by citizenship. So it's time to consolidate the scattered Tatars, collecting not Tatar lands, but Tatars themselves, no matter, what citizenship they have. And the number of Tatars is now determined not by the number of inhabitants of Tatarstan, but by the number of self–determining Tatars all over the planet, a billion Tatars. And the land under Bashkortostan Tatars is no longer interesting in terms of joining Tatarstan, as much as Tatars themselves are interesting without joining the land, because extraterritoriality does not imply borders. And there was a census, and swearing, and there will be more, because Tatars as a political nation are already end.
What Moscow thought, making national languages optional, and destroying the model of political nations, including the Russian, but it seemed, that 2 MWh was not enough, so next there was a proposal to build a nuclear power plant for Tatars, increasing energy consumption, and therefore the difference in values. Tatars have so far refused, because they need to somehow write off 2 million half–witted mothers from Tatarstan, along with Tatarstan itself, and take 2 million Tatars in scattered for maintenance, come up with some new forms, some kind of property nation, that exists not around the earth (a means of production and a source of income), but around petrochemistry (a means of production and a source of income), a way to distribute income among their own, etc., all in good time. But the proposal is interesting.
As a result, there are "established" and "failed" economically with a difference of 2 MWh, which can no longer be overcome. And there are incompatible projects of a territorial and extraterritorial nation, one of which must agree to leave. Since consent can only be imposed by force, this will involve other players (Chuvash, meadow Cheremisa, Udmurt — protection of diasporas or their evacuation as refugees) with the spread of the conflict throughout the Volga region. It is too late to buy Tatars by offering 2 million Russians instead of 1 million Tatars. It is impossible to sign Bashkir for the revision of borders. Expelling Tatars from Bashkortostan is more than 1 million refugees, it is also impossible to assimilate them, as well as Jews. Will not be able to pour money in, it is 2 trillion and ten years of development at least, it's very much and time is lost. Let's see, what happens next.
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Videoformat — The Tatar — Bashkir War..
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